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Abstract 
This study examines time-period and industry heterogeneity of innovation activity in 
Japan from 1964 to 2006 using patent data and non-consolidated firm data. This study 
focuses on the following three periods, based on changes of the Japanese patent 
system, in and non-manufacturing industries: I) before 1976; II) 1976–1987; and III) 
after 1988. Specifically, for each degree of patent protection in each industry, this 
study examines how innovation activities are affected by the following determinants 
found in the innovation literature: size, market competition, and search variety (depth 
and scope). Empirical results show that when using the entire sample from 1964 to 
2006, the size effect on innovation is significantly positive. In addition, the effects of 
market competition and search variety on innovation are inverse-U. When 
considering time-period heterogeneity, the effects of size and search variety are 
similar to the entire period; however, the inverse-U effect of market competition is 
broken after 1988. On the other hand, when considering industry heterogeneity, the 
effects of size and search variety are similar to the entire sample, but differ between 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. In addition, the effect of market 
competition is not statistically significant in either industry. 
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1. Introduction 
 Understanding corporate innovation activities is a key topic, not only in the academic field, 
but also for industry and government. From the standpoint of competition policy, it is important to 
question how the degree of patent protection (i.e., appropriability condition) affects innovation 
activities. In Japan, from 1964 to the early 2000s, although there were more than a dozen revisions, 
key changes in patent filing activity took place three times: single claim system (before 1976); 
multiple claim system (1976-1987); the improved multiple claim system (after 1988) (Goto and 
Motohashi, 2007; Motohashi, 2004; Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001). When focusing on patenting 
activities during the period, the number of patent application and registration tends to increase over 
time (Goto and Motohashi, 2007). Apparently, the strengthening of intellectual property protection 
encourages innovation activities in Japan. Based on this background, this study aims to further 
examine whether there is time-period and industry heterogeneity in innovation activities (i.e., 
patenting activities), focusing on the basic determinants discussed in the innovation literature.  
 The motivation of this study is to examine whether changes in the degree protections in 
Japan’s patent system affect Japanese firms’ innovation activities. Since the last half of 1990s, 
following developments in the U.S. and other developed countries (such as effect of Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in the Uruguay Round of General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade in 1995), patent policy in Japan has shifted from an anti-patent policy toward a 
pro-patent policy (i.e., “IP-based Nation” was formulated in 2002 by Former Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi). After the enactment of the Science and Technology Basic Law in 1995, the 
Intellectual Property Basic Act was enacted in 2002, and Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters 
and Intellectual Property High Court were established respectively in 2003 and 2005. From these 
enforcements of policy, Japan is considered to progressively reinforce intellectual property 
protection. Against this pro-patent policy, however, the current trend of innovation in the world is 
moving toward the era of open innovation, and strict protection of intellectual property also has a 
harmful effect on innovation. Therefore, Japan will need to review this series of pro-patent policies 
sooner or later. To examine what type of effect on innovative activities will be caused by further 
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protection of intellectual property, as at the first onset, this study aims to empirically investigate how 
the effects of innovation determinants in the literature have historically changed in Japan along with 
the changes in the degree of patent protection. 
 Corporate innovation studies have a long history beginning with Schumpeter (1942). Many 
studies in this field are associated with the Schumpeterian hypothesis, although test results for the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis are still considered inconclusive (for a comprehensive literature review, 
see Cohen and Levin, 1989; Gilbert, 2006; Cohen, 2010). Instead of the Schumpeterian view of 
innovation activity, in recent years, innovation search processes have focused on evolutionary 
economics. Laursen (2012) discusses that firms often need to access a variety of inputs to achieve 
successful innovation. Specifically, in this context, it is important to examine how firms manage 
exploitative search (or local search) and exploratory search (boundary-spanning or non-local search).  
 This study examines how and what types of determinants affect innovation activities in 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, focusing on time-period and industry 
heterogeneity across the three periods: I) before 1976; II) 1976–1987; and III) after 1988. 
Specifically, this study uses firm data from 1964 to 2006, which consist of non-consolidated 
financial data and Institute of Intellectual Property Patent Database (IIP-DB). IIP-DB is based on the 
Japan Patent Office standardized data, and was developed by Institute of Intellectual Property
1
 and 
Goto and Motohashi (2007).  
 This study aims to contribute to the literature in two ways: by using longitudinal data and 
analyzing basic determinants in the literature. When empirically examining determinants of 
innovation, as described above, inconsistent results are often found (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Gilbert, 
2006; Cohen, 2010). This suggests that empirical results may depend largely on the sample 
conditions such as country, industry, or time-period. Among statistical or empirical studies 
examining innovation activities in Japan, representative studies are Ijichi et al. (2004, 2010), Inui et 
al. (2012), and Motohashi (2011, 2012). While these studies focus on short-term samples, this study 
uses longitudinal data from 1964 to 2006, divided into manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
                                                   
1
 http://www.iip.or.jp/e/e_patentdb/ 
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industries. Inconsistent results in the literature also suggest that determinants of innovation may vary 
widely and be composite. However, to deepen the debate on the determinants, it will be more 
appropriate to use popular determinants in the literature than a wide variety of ad-hoc determinants. 
Therefore, this study uses basic and popular determinants. Concretely, they are size and market 
competition, which are classic factors in the industrial organization and exploitative and exploratory 
searches (search depth and scope, respectively), which has begun to garner attention in the 
evolutionary economics.  
 A short summary of this study follows. In terms of the entire sample during 1964-2006, 
size effect on innovation is positive. The size elasticity is approximately 0.22. In addition, the effects 
of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI; as proxy for market competition) and search depth and scope 
on innovation are inverse-U. When considering time-period heterogeneity, the effects of size and 
search depth and scope are similar to that of the entire period. The inverse-U effect of HHI, however, 
is broken after 1988. On the other hand, when considering industry heterogeneity, effects of size and 
search variety are also similar to the entire sample, but slightly different between manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries. In addition, the effect of HHI is not statistically significant in both 
industries.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the background of this study. 
This section firstly introduces the Japanese patent system and IIP-DB. Secondly, it discusses size and 
competition as innovation factors in the industrial organization and reviews Japanese studies. The 
section then introduces search variety in the evolutionary economics. Section 3 describes the 
empirical strategy and model, and Section 4 shows the data. Section 5 shows estimated results, and 
carefully checks each of determinants. Finally, Section 6 holds the conclusion.  
 
 
2. Backgrounds 
2.1 Patent system and innovation activity in Japan 
From the standpoint of competition policy, it is important to question how the degree of 
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patent protection (i.e., appropriability condition) affects innovation activities. Although Japan’s 
patent laws have been revised multiple times, Japan’s patent system has significantly changed three 
times from 1964 to 2006: single claim system (before 1976); multiple claim system (1976-1987); 
and the improved multiple claim system (after 1988) (Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001; Motohashi, 
2004). 
Before 1976, Japanese patent law allowed for only one independent, single claim to be 
included in an invention. This system is not as popular in other developed countries. With a 1976 
amendment to the patent law, the multiple claim system was implemented. In this system, a patent 
filing can have claims of possible embodiments (i.e., dependent claims); however, the degree of 
appropriability condition in this system is almost the same as it was in the single claim system. This 
is because the claims of possible embodiments are not intended to draw any boundaries of technical 
scope or patent rights. In the 1988 reform, the improved multiple claim system was implemented, 
making multiple claims possible in one application, similar to other countries. Note that in addition 
to the three periods, Goto and Motohashi (2007) argue that there is a large effect from the pro-grant 
opposition system to post-grant opposition system to patent filing activity from 1996 to 2003 
(however, in 2004, the post-grant opposition system was revoked and an alternative new system of 
trial for patent invalidation was implemented).  
Recently, the Institute of Intellectual Property and Goto and Motohashi (2007) developed 
IIP-DB based on the Japan Patent Office standardized data. Goto and Motohashi (2007) illustrated 
the trend of the number of registered patents in Japan over time (Figure 5, p.1436). The whole 
tendency of the registered patents is very few before 1976, flat or in uptrend from 1976 to 1987, 
increasing from 1988, jumping in proximity in 1996, and has been on a declining trend since about 
2000. This indicates that as the degree of intellectual property protection is strengthened in a phased 
manner, innovation activities in Japan have been encouraged over time.  
Based on the background of patenting activities in Japan, this study further examines how 
and what types of determinants affect innovation activities, focusing on time-period heterogeneity 
(or patent system heterogeneity) across the three periods: I) before 1976; II) 1976–1987; and III) 
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after 1988. This study also considers industry heterogeneity between manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries because innovation activities may be different between the industries. 
Using IIP-DB, this study empirically examines possible determinants in the innovation literature. 
Candidates for the determinants are size and market competition, which are classic and popular in 
the industrial organization literature, and search variety (depth and scope), which has begun to 
garner attention in the evolutionary economics literature.  
 
2.2 Size and market competition  
Understanding the relationship between competition and innovation has long been a major 
focus of industrial organization, both theoretically and empirically (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Gilbert, 
2006; Cohen, 2010). Schumpeter (1942) argued that more monopolistic firms can more readily 
perform research and development (R&D) activities because of reduced market uncertainty and 
more stable funding. Since then, many studies have examined the so-called Schumpeterian 
hypotheses that innovation activity is promoted by large firms and by imperfect competition 
(Kamien and Schwartz, 1975; Acs and Audretsch, 1987, 1988a, 1988b).  
The former Schumpeterian hypothesis that large firms promote innovation activity is 
mainly supported in the literature (Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Cohen, 2010).
2
 In particular, many 
studies have shown that the amount of R&D conducted by performers is closely related to the size of 
the firm, while R&D productivity declines with firm size (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). Meanwhile, 
Acs and Audretsch (1988a) argue that size factors such as firm size and R&D have disparate effects 
on large and small firms, implying that there is U-shaped relationship between innovation and firm 
size.  
On the other hand, the latter Schumpeterian hypothesis that innovation activity is 
promoted by imperfect competition has been inconclusive, generally depending on the measures of 
                                                   
2
 In interpreting the positive function of firm size on innovation activity, there are primarily four 
views in the innovation literature (see Cohen, 2010): 1) larger firms can finance risky R&D more 
aggressively; 2) R&D function itself has economies of scales; 3) larger firms face larger markets, 
spreading innovation (fixed) costs over sales (i.e., cost spreading theory); 4) large and diversified 
firms have economies of scope or reduced risk related to innovation. 
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competition and innovation (see Cohen, 2010). To measure competition, empirical studies often use 
1) traditional competition measures such as concentration and price-cost margin (PCM) (e.g., 
Horowitz, 1962; Scherer, 1967), 2) survey-based measures (e.g., part of Nickell, 1996), and 3) 
market-entry/exit measures (e.g., Motohashi, 2011, 2012). On the other hand, in recent decades, to 
measure innovation, empirical studies often use 1) R&D (as innovation inputs) especially in the 
early literature (e.g., Horowitz, 1962; Scherer, 1967), 2) other innovation measures such as the 
number of new products or patent measure (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1987, 1988a, 1988b; Blundell 
et al., 1999; Aghion et al., 2005), and 3) total factor productivity (TFP) measures (e.g., Nickell, 
1996; Inui et al., 2012). Note that regarding relationship between competition and innovation, a 
negative relationship often refers to less competition or more concentration is associated with more 
innovation in line with Schumpeterian hypothesis, while a positive relationship is the opposite.  
In the empirical studies, the relationship between competition (a lower degree of 
concentration) and R&D is most likely to be found as negative in line with the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis. Using a unique dataset, Horowitz (1962) found that in the more concentrated industries, 
firms are more likely to maintain research organizations and allow for higher research expenditures. 
Scherer (1967) also found that, in a general trend of the sample in manufacturing industries, market 
concentration ratio is positively related to the number of technical engineers plus natural scientists 
and R&D expenditures.  
On the other hand, when using other measures of innovation output such as patents and 
TFP growth, the results often become ambiguous. A series of studies carried out in Acs and 
Audretsch (1987, 1988a, 1988b) serves as a useful reference. Acs and Audretsch (1987) used 
different measures of the number of innovations per employee between the large-firm and small-firm 
as the innovation rate, and found a negative relationship in line with the Schumpeterian hypothesis. 
On the other hand, Acs and Audretsch (1988b) used the raw value of the number of innovations per 
employee as the dependent variable, and found the innovation activity is discouraged by market 
concentration, suggesting a positive relationship. In addition, Acs and Audretsch (1988a), using the 
number of innovations as the dependent variable, found that the innovation activity is encouraged by 
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large-firm employment share, but is discouraged by market concentration (i.e., positive relationship). 
The positive relationship between competition and innovation is also found in other studies. 
Blundell et al. (1999) used a count of technologically significant and commercially important 
innovations of 3,551 observations in manufacturing industries listed in U.K., and found innovation is 
correlated positively with market share (i.e., in line with the Schumpeterian hypothesis), but 
negatively with industry concentration as in Acs and Audretsch (1988a). Also, Nickell (1996) 
adopted market share at the firm level and concentration ratio in the empirical model of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function. Using a total 676 observations in U.K. from 1972 to 1986, the 
author found TFP growth is positively correlated with competition.  
Recently, Aghion et al. (2005) built a stylized model to support an inverse-U pattern 
between product market competition and innovation. The authors also empirically support this 
pattern using UK industry data (17 industries over the period from 1973 to 1994) using a kind of 
PCM measure as a competition measure. However, prior empirical studies that test for the inverse-U 
relationship have been inconclusive. Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) test the inverse-U relationship 
using Swedish manufacturing firm data from 1990 to 2000. The authors use firm-level R&D data as 
the innovation measure and HHI and PCM as competition measures. The result shows that the 
inverse-U relationship is supported by HHI but not by PCM. In addition, Correa (2012) analyzes 
how the establishment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 has 
affected the relationship between innovation and competition. The author finds a structural break in 
the early 1980s, using the same dataset in Aghion et al. (2005). This indicates that there was a 
positive relationship during the period from 1973 to 1982, and a no-significance relationship in the 
period from 1983 to 1994, suggesting the existence of time heterogeneity.  
 
2.3 Innovation studies in Japan 
The inconclusiveness in the innovation literature suggests that innovation activity may 
depend largely on the sample. In terms of innovation studies in Japan, representative studies are 
Ijichi et al. (2004, 2010), Inui et al. (2012), and Motohashi (2011, 2012). These studies 
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comprehensively examine innovation activity based on statistics or empirical analysis.  
Ijichi et al. (2004, 2010) examine corporate innovation policies in all of Japan, using a 
questionnaire survey of 9,257 firms from 1999 to 2001 as the first survey (Ijichi et al., 2004) and 
4,579 firms from fiscal years 2006 to 2008 as the second survey (Ijichi et al., 2010), in the 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries industry, mining and manufacturing industry, and service industry. 
Summarizing the surveyed results related to market competition, Ijichi et al. (2004) show that 74% 
of respondents replied that innovation activity is effective in increasing market share among 
companies that promote innovation activity, whereas 51% replied that innovation activity is not 
necessary because of their market circumstances among companies that do not promote innovation 
activity (Table 27, pp. 118-135). On the other hand, Ijichi et al. (2010) show that among companies 
that achieve product innovation (i.e., 43.9% of entire sample), 75.6% for Japanese market and 80.5% 
for the foreign market, replied that product innovation increases the market share from zero to five 
percent (Figure 4-11, p.40). These results suggest a mutual relationship between competition and 
innovation as in Aghion et al. (2005).  
The other two studies are empirical studies, rather than statistical. Using Japanese 
comprehensive manufacturing data (from a basic survey of business activities of enterprises) from 
1997 to 2003, Inui et al. (2012) examine the relationship between competition and innovation. The 
authors use PCM measure (i.e., 1−Lerner index as same as Aghion et al. (2005)) at the firm and 
industry average level as a proxy for competition, and TFP growth as a proxy for innovation. The 
result shows an inverse-U relationship in Japan.  
Motohashi (2011, 2012) uses the IIP-DB and a census of establishment and enterprise 
from 2001 and 2006, empirically examining the relationship between the firm’s survival and patent 
filing in Japan. The author argues that innovation may decrease or increase a firm’s survival because 
innovation has two risks, technological and commercial. To examine whether firms surpass the 
commercial risk, the author assesses how patent filing (i.e., innovation) affects a firm’s survival. The 
result of the probit regression model shows that commercial risk surpasses technological capability 
in these periods in Japan, which implies a positive relationship between competition and innovation.  
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When roughly classifying these three studies, Ijichi et al. (2004, 2010) and Inui et al. 
(2012) support the mutual or inverse-U relationship, whereas Motohashi (2011, 2012) indirectly 
supports the positive relationship. While the three studies analyze Japanese data for the short term, 
this study examines time-period and industry heterogeneity, using long-term data during the period 
from 1964 to 2006. Note that the IIP-DB is also used in Motohashi (2011, 2012). Specifically, this 
study focuses on the effects of size and market competition in each time-period in each of 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries.  
 
2.4 Search depth and scope 
 In the evolutionary economics literature, Laursen (2012) argues that balancing exploitative 
search (or local search) and exploratory search (boundary-spanning or non-local search) is critical in 
the search for variety, which leads to successful innovation. A representative study is that of Katila 
and Ahuja (2002) who focus on how firms search or solve problems to create new products. The 
authors examine whether the number of new products is affected by the degree of search at the firm 
level in the robotics industry in Europe, Japan, and United States from 1985 to 1996. Using patent 
data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the authors make two search variables: 
search depth and search scope. Search depth describes repetition from using the same knowledge 
(i.e., citation of the same patents) associated with exploitative search, whereas, search scope 
describes the portion of new knowledge citation (i.e., citation of new patents) associated with 
exploratory search. The authors uniquely hypothesize that search depth and scope increase 
innovation, but over-searching decreases innovation (i.e., penalty for profit). As a result, the authors 
find the inverse-U relationship of search depth and innovation, but only a positive relationship of 
search scope and innovation.  
We consider search depth and scope worth analyzing especially when using patent data 
since citation information is available in patent data. Therefore, following Katila and Ahuja (2002), 
this study uses search depth and scope variables. Specifically, this study hypothesizes the inverse-U 
relationship of each search variable.  
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Empirical strategy and variables 
 This study empirically examines time-period and industry heterogeneity of innovation 
activity in Japan using the IIP-DB and non-consolidated financial statements obtained from the 
Nikkei NEEDS database of Nikkei Inc. from 1964 to 2006. Although consolidated data is ideal for 
capturing innovation activity, it is usually difficult to prepare enough observations of consolidated 
data before 2000 for Japan. This is because the principle of consolidated financial statements was not 
fully introduced at Japanese firms until March in 2000.  
 This study examines the time-period and industry heterogeneity in the regression model, 
dividing the entire sample into each period (I: 1964-1975; II: 1976-1987; III: 1988-2006) and/or 
each industry (i.e., manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries). Hence, we estimate 12 
specifications (i.e., 3 industries (all, manufacturing, and non-manufacturing industries) multiplied by 
4 periods: periods all, I, II, and III).  
 As a dependent variable proxy for innovation activity, we use registered patents (denoted 
by reg) in applicant year as a proxy for innovation. When using patent measures, empirical studies 
generally use application patents, registered patents, or citation weighted data (e.g., Aghion et al., 
2005; Motohashi, 2011, 2012). Application patents enable earlier access than other variables. In this 
sense, it is useful to capture the innovation trend. Because an application may be withdrawn, not be 
requested for examination, or not be registered, however, application patents may be overestimated 
as a proxy for innovation. From this angle, registered patents are considered a more reasonable 
proxy for innovation than application patents. On the other hand, these two variables may not 
appropriately indicate innovation importance or quality. To avoid this problem, the studies 
sometimes use citation data to weigh each patent value (e.g., Hall et al., 2001). However, the 
problem associated with citation-weighted patents is that calculation and the methodologies are often 
complex because of how many things need to be accounted for, such as propensity or obsolescence 
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of patents and technology field (see Hall et al., 2001).  
 In terms of independent variables in the industrial organization, this study uses total assets 
(denoted by assets) as a proxy for firm size, and HHI as a proxy for market competition. In the 
innovation literature, traditionally two competition measures, HHI and PCM, are used.
3
 HHI is most 
popular among the two, and it is easy to interpret because missing values are unlikely to occur in 
definition. One shortcoming, however, is that it requires whole market share, which may be difficult 
to obtain. In addition, in estimating market share, how to identify the extent of the market may be 
arbitrary for researchers. On the other hand, PCM is also often used against the theoretical 
background of the Lerner index. In empirical studies, because price and cost are not usually obtained, 
the sales-profit ratio is typically used as PCM (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005). However, profit may take a 
negative value, and therefore, PCM can be negative contrary to the definition. In this sense, PCM 
measure is often difficult to use in empirical studies.  
Regarding search variables, following Katila and Ahuja (2002), we create search variables: 
depth and scope. In terms of search depth, the authors argue that significant value of the knowledge 
is lost within approximately five years in high-technology companies, and use repetition within five 
years as a numerator of the proportion. However, how to determine the reference term (years) is 
problematic because this study investigates comprehensive industries, including non-manufacturing 
industries. This is also difficult because the dependent variable in this study is based on the patent 
measure, as well as search variable. To make it easier to compare other empirical studies, we use 
repetition within a corresponding single year rather than some previous years. This study defines 
depth as follows:  
 it it itdepth repetition count total citations  (1)  
where i and t denote firm and year, respectively. Similarly, search scope is defined as follows:  
 it it itscope new citations total citations   (2)  
                                                   
3
 Recently, Boone (2008a, 2008b) proposes relative profits (RP) and relative profit differences 
(RPD) as an adequate proxy for competition. 
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In definition, these values range from 0 to 1.
4
  
 For the hypothesis setting of HHI, depth, and scope, following Aghion et al. (2005) and 
Katila and Ahuja (2002), this study hypothesizes a quadratic relationship toward innovation. 
Therefore, we include linear and quadratic terms of HHI, depth, and scope, and carefully check 
whether the relationship is inverse-U, positive, negative, U-shape, or no-significance, as described in 
the section below.  
In addition, a key issue in a regression model is omitted variable bias or endogeneity, 
possibly leading to loss of consistency. It is, however, generally difficult to specify omitted 
determinants of the innovation process in the innovation literature. Note that because a regression 
model of this study is not a set of simultaneous equations or a dynamic model, mutual causality or 
simultaneity is not an issue in this study. We consider that innovation activity is generally expected 
to be highly correlated with corporate productivity or profitability. For example, innovation activity 
should be related to investment situations such as R&D, and it affects corporate business 
performance. To remove the omitted variable bias as much as possible, we firstly include firm and 
yearly fixed-effects in the model to control unobserved firm characteristics and yearly macro shocks. 
In addition, as control variables, we use capital and labor productivity (denoted by kprod and lprod, 
respectively) and profit rate (denoted by profitrate).  
 
3.2 Regression model 
Based on the above discussion, to examine the determinants of innovation activity, this 
study uses a fixed-effects regression model, controlling unobserved firm fixed-effects with year 
dummies. As a dependent variable proxy for innovation activity, we use the number of registered 
patents (reg) plus one in the log-form (ln(reg+1)). The natural log is used to directly estimate 
elasticities of determinants. One is added to avoid the natural logarithm of zero. In terms of a scale 
variable (asset), we also take the natural log-form (lnassets) to estimate size elasticity.  
The model of this study is as follows:  
                                                   
4
 Note that we use citation data of all patent applications rather than that of only registered patents 
because all citation data will reflect the search characteristics adequately. 
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2 2
0 1 2 2 3 3
2
4 4 5 6 7
ln( 1) lnit it it it it it
it it it it it i t it
reg + assets HHI HHI depth depth
scope scope kprod lprod profitrate
     
       
          
            
 (3)  
 
where i and t denote firm i in applicant year t, and ε denotes an error term. This model includes 
linear and quadratic terms of HHI, depth, and scope, respectively, to analyze the quadratic effects 
discussed in the literature.  
 
3.3 Tests for inverse-U effect  
 In terms of HHI, depth, and scope, this study carefully checks the effect and statistical 
significance for coefficients of the linear and quadratic terms. Firstly, using the Wald test, we test 
joint hypothesis whether the nonlinear (quadratic) effect is statistically significant (i.e., the 
coefficients of linear and quadratic terms are simultaneously zero).  
 We next test whether the effect is inverse-U, following Lind and Mehlum (2010). The 
authors argue that the sufficient condition for inverse-U is that there is only one extreme point of 
local maximum. The requirement for an inverse-U shape is that a slope of the curve is positive at the 
start and negative at the end of the interval of each focal variable. In addition to U and inverse-U 
relationship, this study is further interested in other shapes, positive, negative, or no-significance.  
Specifically, this study adopts a following series of null hypotheses to categorize the 
quadratic relationship. Suppose β and γ denote coefficients of linear and quadratic terms, respectively, 
and x denotes certain focal variables ranging [xl, xh] in a certain regression model. Although Lind 
and Mehlum (2010) propose two one-sided tests, this study adopts the following two two-sided tests 
to assess slopes of the curve at start and end as follows:  
 
 0 1: 2 0 vs. : 2 0
L L
l lH x H x        (4)  
 0 1: 2 0 vs. : 2 0
H H
h hH x H x         (5)  
 
Following the test results, we identify a curve shape, which has five potential types of relationships: 
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inverse-U, U-shape, positive, negative, and no-significance. As in Lind and Mehlum (2010), 
inverse-U relationship as a slope of the curve is positive at the start and negative at the end of an 
interval, whereas U relationship as a slope of the curve is negative at the start and positive at the end 
of an interval. We further divide the other patterns into positive, negative, and no-significance 
relationships. A positive relationship is considered slope at the start and/or end is positive at a 
statistically significant level, whereas a negative relationship is considered slope at the start and/or 
end is negative at a statistically significant level. In terms of the rest, a no-significance relationship is 
considered when both slopes of the curve at the start and end are not statistically significant from 
zero.  
 In addition, we visually check the shape of quadratic curve and statistical significance in 
terms of HHI, depth, and scope. In the model, partial effect of x is represented as βx+γx
2
. On the 
other hand, in terms of statistical significance, we calculate upper and lower bounds of 95% 
confidential interval. The interval at α% is calculated as partial effect plus or minus t-value at 
(100−α)% level, multiplied by standard error of partial effect: 
     2 2 4 2var var 2 cov ,x x t x x x x               (where “var” and “cov” denote 
variance and covariance of estimators, respectively).  
 
 
4. Data 
The data for this study consists of Japanese firm data and patent data obtained from the 
Nikkei NEEDS database of Nikkei Inc. and IIP-DB (Goto and Motohashi, 2007). We use the IIP-DB 
published on March 30 in 2011 (i.e., iipdb20110330). The database includes patent application data, 
patent registration data, applicant data, rights holder data, citation information, and inventor data.  
 To merge financial data (Nikkei NEEDS) and patent data (IIP-DB), we used the applicant 
list of the IIP-DB as in Motohashi (2011, 2012). In the Japanese patent system, similar to the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act amended in 2011 in the U.S., inventors and applicants do not have 
to match. Investors are persons and can be applicants at the beginning, and applicants (which may be 
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artificial persons) are potential patentees. In most cases, when an employee invention is made in a 
certain company, although the inventing staff is an investor, the company becomes an applicant.  
Specifically, we first match the firm data with a patent applicant list from the IIP-DB. We 
then cover changes in business names and head office addresses for all of the samples from investor 
relations and financial reports, among others. Consequently, we match the business names with the 
applicant name found in a database. Some characters in the list are occasionally wrong, probably due 
to the degree of accuracy of optical character recognition. Hence, we re-check the matched list for 
errors. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of data. Figure 1 shows scatter plots of the entire 
sample in terms of firm size (total assets), competition (HHI), and search variables (depth and scope) 
toward raw registered patents at the firm and industry-average levels. The entire sample has 94,108 
firm-level observations (where the net number of firms is 3,449) from 1964 to 2006, and the 
observations in period I (1964-1975), II (1976-1987), and III (1988-2006) are 17,909, 24,897, and 
51,302, respectively.  
This study uses large industry classification (manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
industries) based on a three-digit industry classification of Nikkei NEEDS database (see Appendix 
Table 1). Manufacturing industries (observations: 54,761) consist of the following 17 industries: 
food, textile, pulp and paper, chemical, pharmaceutical products, petroleum, rubber, ceramic, iron 
and steel, non-ferrous metal, machinery, electric machinery, shipbuilding, automobile, other 
transport equipment, precision machinery, and other. On the other hand, non-manufacturing industry 
(observations: 39,347) consists of the following 16 industries: fishery, mining, building, trading 
interests, retail, other financial industry, estate, rail and bus service, land transportation, marine 
transportation, air transportation, warehousing and allied transportation, communication, electric 
utility, gas utility, and other service.  
HHI in this study is calculated by using sales share in the entire sample for each year for 
each small industry classification (17 manufacturing and 16 non-manufacturing industries). 
Observation for HHI estimation is 95,081, and larger than the observation for the regression model 
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because there are missing values related to financial data, except for sales (see Appendix Table A1).  
 In terms of control variables, we consider value added as business economic values of 
firms, and calculate value added as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA), plus labor costs
5
. Using fixed assets (million yen) and employee numbers (person) as 
capital and labor factors, respectively, this study calculates capital and labor productivities (kprod 
and lprod) as value added divided by each of capital and labor factors in the natural log-form as 
follows:  
  lnit it itkprod value added fixed assets  (6)  
  lnit it itlprod value added employee number  (7)  
where i and t denote firm and year, respectively. On the other hand, profitability is often calculated 
as profit divided by business economic value. Using earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as 
profit, this study defines profitability (profitrate) as follows:  
 it it itprofitrate EBIT value added . (8)  
Profitrate reflects how much companies can retain from value added. Note that because EBIT takes 
a negative value in our dataset, profitrate also takes negative value.  
 
 
5. Results 
Table 2 shows the regression result. In terms of time heterogeneity, the estimated 
observations are for all periods in columns 1, 2, and 3, the period I (1964-1975) in columns 4, 5, and 
6, the period II (1976-1987) in columns 7, 8, and 9, and the period III (1976-1987) in columns 10, 11, 
and 12. In terms of industry heterogeneity, the estimate observations are all industries in columns 1, 
4, 7, and 10, manufacturing industries in columns 2, 5, 8, and 11, and non-manufacturing industries 
                                                   
5
 Labor cost is calculated by sum of the following variables in Nikkei NEEDS database: 1) 
operating labor cost and allied welfare cost; 2) labor cost for sales and marketing and allied welfare 
cost; 3) board members’ compensation and employee bonus. Note that these three variables are 
ambiguous among firms and may take missing values. Therefore, this study substitutes zero value 
for missing values. 
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in columns 3, 6, 9, and 12.  
The middle part of table shows the result of the joint test (Wald test) for linear and 
quadratic terms of HHI, depth, and scope, respectively (where each value denotes F-value). The 
lower part of the table shows the result of the slope test at the start and end of each interval: HHI, 
depth, and scope. Each value denotes slope at minimum and maximum of the interval. Following the 
slope tests of both sides, “Pos”, “Neg”, and “invU” denote positive, negative, and inverse-U 
relationship of each curve, respectively. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show partial effects of HHI, depth, and 
scope, respectively. The lines denote the estimated partial effect (βx+γx
2
), and the dashed lines 
denote upper and lower bounds of 95% confidential interval. Appendix Figures A1, A2, and A3 show 
scatter plots of HHI, depth, and scope, respectively, toward ln(reg+1).  
 
5.1 Size 
In terms of size elasticity, the coefficient of lnassets is statistically significantly different 
from zero and positive in all specifications except for the non-manufacturing industries in period II 
(#9 in Table 2). In all industries in all periods (#1), the elasticity is 0.223.  
When considering time heterogeneity in all industries, the elasticities are 0.144, 0.114, and 
0.137 in the periods I, II, and III, respectively (#4, 7, and 10). This indicates that the elasticities are 
similar among each period (between 0.114 and 0.144), but are lower than the entire period (0.223).  
On the other hand, when considering industry heterogeneity, the elasticity in all periods is 
0.434 in the manufacturing industries (#2) (0.242, 0.232, and 0.296 in the periods I, II, and III, 
respectively, in #5, 8, and 11), and 0.065 in the non-manufacturing industries (#3) (0.048 and 0.053 
in the periods I and III, respectively, in #6 and 12; non-significance in the period II in #9). This 
indicates that firm size is much more important for innovation in the manufacturing industries than 
the non-manufacturing industries. This also indicates that the elasticities are similar among each 
period, but become smallest in the period II (#7, 8, and 9).  
 
5.2 Market competition 
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In terms of market competition (HHI), the joint test for HHI and HHI
2
 shows that the 
effect of HHI is statistically significant in all industries in all periods in I, II, and III (#1, 4, 7, and 
10), and non-manufacturing industries in period III (#12). Among these, the slope test of HHI shows 
that the effect is inverse-U in all industries in periods all, I, and II (#1, 4, and 7), and negative in all 
and non-manufacturing industries in period III (#10 and 12).  
Based on the result, inverse-U effect of HHI is shown in all industries in all periods (#1) as 
in Aghion et al. (2005). The extremum point of HHI is 0.419.  
When considering industry heterogeneity, the effect is not significant in manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries (#2 and 3). Note that the effect in manufacturing industries in all 
periods (#2) is inverse-U, but not significant in the joint test. This result will illustrate how fragile 
the relationship between competition and innovation is in the literature. In a technical sense, there 
may be two reasons for this. One is that industrial classifications are often not appropriate for actual 
business boundaries. Another explanation is that competition variables are likely to be rough because 
they are often observed at industry or sector levels, not at firm or business establishment levels. 
Indeed, HHI in this study is observed at intervals (see Appendix Figure A1). These issues may make 
the relationship between competition and innovation unclear.  
We then check time-period heterogeneity. In all industries, the effect shifts from inverse-U 
in periods I and II (#4 and 7) to negative in period III (#10). Specifically, the extremum point moves 
from 0.603 in period I (#4) to 0.417 in period II (#7). In period III (#3), because of the negative 
relationship, the highest effect occurs where HHI is equal to zero. This may indicate a kind of 
structural break, as in Correa (2012). It suggests that as the degree of patent protection 
(appropriability) intensifies, the innovation rate is encouraged by more competition (i.e., positive 
relationship in the literature).  
 
5.3 Search depth 
In terms of depth, the joint test shows that the effect of depth is statistically significantly 
different from zero in all specifications. On the other hand, the slope test (u-test) denotes that the 
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effect is inverse-U in all specifications. This result is in line with Katila and Ahuja (2002).  
When considering time-period heterogeneity, the inverse-U shape is almost the same 
among the periods, but the extremum point in the period III is larger than that of the other two 
periods. In all industries (#1, 4, 7, and 10), the extremum points are 0.212 in all periods, 0.203 in 
period I, 0.208 in period II, and 0.283 in period III.  
On the other hand, when considering industry heterogeneity, the extremum point in the 
manufacturing industries is smaller than in the non-manufacturing industries. The extremum points 
are 0.201 in the manufacturing industries in all periods (#2) (0.195, 0.190, and 0.251 in periods I, II, 
and III, respectively, in #5, 8, and 11), and 0.244 in non-manufacturing industries in all periods (#3) 
(0.335, 0.300, and 0.298 in the periods I, II, and III, respectively, in #6, 9, and 12). This indicates 
that depth is required more in non-manufacturing industries than manufacturing industries.  
One of key characteristics of this result is that the penalty for innovation is strict (see 
Figure 3). As depth grows from zero to one, the innovation rate increases, peaks, decreases, and then 
gets lower than the start point (i.e., where depth is more than two times higher than the extremum 
point; e.g., approximately 0.4-0.6).  
 
5.4 Search scope 
In terms of scope, the joint test shows that effect of scope is statistically significantly 
different from zero in all specifications. On the other hand, the slope test shows that the effect of 
scope is inverse-U in all specifications except for the non-manufacturing industries in period I (#6). 
In #6, a non-significance relationship is found. This result basically supports the inverse-U 
relationship unlike that of Katila and Ahuja (2002), who show a positive relationship between scope 
and innovation.  
In terms of time heterogeneity, the inverse-U shape is almost the same among the periods. 
The extremum points in all industries are 0.609, 0.662, 0.619, and 0.685 in all periods, I, II, and III, 
respectively (#1, 4, 7, and 10).  
On the other hand, in terms of industry heterogeneity, the extremum point of inverse-U in 
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manufacturing industries is larger than in non-manufacturing industries. The extremum points of 
inverse-U are 0.630 in the manufacturing industries in all periods (#2) (0.657, 0.625, and 0.700 in 
the periods I, II, and III, respectively, in #5, 8, and 11), and 0.573 in the non-manufacturing 
industries in all periods (#3) (0.624 and 0.603 in the periods II and III, respectively; non-significance 
in period I). The opposite of depth, this indicates that scope is more required in manufacturing 
industries than non-manufacturing industries. 
In addition, compared to depth, the penalty of over-searching for scope is more modest 
than depth (see Figures 3 and 4). As scope gets large from zero to one, the innovation rate increases, 
peaks, and decreases. It does not, however, get lower than the starting point; therefore, the 
innovation rate is lowest where scope is 0.  
 
5.5 Control variables 
In terms of control variables, the coefficient of capital productivity (kprod) is statistically 
significantly different from zero and positive in 8 specifications (#1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, and 12). The 
coefficient of labor productivity (lprod) is statistically significantly different from zero and negative 
in 8 specifications (#1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, and 12). The coefficient of profitability (profitrate) is 
statistically significantly negative in 2 specifications (#4 and 5).  
While the result is not always robust, it shows that capital and labor productivities tend to 
be associated positively and negatively with innovation rate, respectively. This indicates that firms 
with less capital and more employees are more likely to be innovative in Japan. In addition, although 
some specifications show a negative relationship, profit rate is not likely to be correlated to 
innovation rate.  
In terms of industry heterogeneity in all industries (#2 and 3), the elasticities of capital 
productivity are 0.125 and 0.033 in manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, respectively. 
On the other hand, the elasticities of labor productivity are −0.095 and −0.048 in manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries, respectively. Therefore, absolute values of the elasticities in 
manufacturing industries are larger than in non-manufacturing industries. This indicates that capital 
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or labor conditions are more important in promoting innovation in manufacturing industries than in 
non-manufacturing industries.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 This study examines time-period and industry heterogeneity of innovation activity in Japan 
from 1964 to 2006 using patent data and non-consolidated firm data. In terms of time-period 
heterogeneity, this study focuses on the following three periods based on changes in the Japanese 
patent system: I) before 1976; II) 1976–1987; and III) after 1988. On the other hand, in terms of 
industry heterogeneity, this study examines both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. 
Specifically, in each degree of patent protection in each industry, this study focuses on the following 
popular determinants in the literature: size, market competition, and search variety (depth and 
scope).  
 In terms of size effect (lnassets), the elasticity value is 0.223 in the entire sample. This 
indicates that a 1% increase in size is associated with a 0.223% increase in innovation rate. The 
positive less-than-one value is often estimated in the innovation literature (Cohen and Levin, 1989; 
Gilbert, 2006; Cohen, 2010). In terms of time-period heterogeneity, the elasticities are similar among 
the three periods (between 0.114 and 0.144); however, they are lower than the entire period. This 
implies that using too-long time series data may lead to over- or under-estimating the size elasticity. 
On the other hand, in terms of industry heterogeneity, the elasticities in the entire period are 0.434 
and 0.065 in manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, respectively. This suggests that the 
manufacturing industry in Japan enjoys larger economies of scale for innovation than does the 
non-manufacturing industry.  
 In terms of market competition, the effect of HHI in the entire sample is inverse-U, as in 
Aghion et al. (2005) and Inui et al. (2012). However, the inverse-U effect is not stable, as argued in 
the innovation literature, when considering time-period and industry heterogeneity. In terms of 
time-period heterogeneity, the effect of HHI in the entire industries significantly changes from 
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inverse-U in periods I and II to a positive relationship in period III (i.e., opposite to the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis). In terms of industry heterogeneity, on the other hand, the effect in the 
entire period is not significant in either the manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries.  
The result of HHI will illustrate how fragile the relationship between competition and 
innovation is in the literature. In the technical sense, there may be two reasons for this fragility. One 
is that industrial classifications often are not appropriate for actual business boundaries. Another is 
that competition variables are likely to be rough because they are often observed at industry or sector 
levels, not at firm or business establishment levels. However, if these technical issues are not 
problematic, the result implies that empirical analysis, which simply uses competition and 
innovation variables as independent and dependent variables, respectively, do not considerably 
contribute to the Schumpeterian hypothesis. This is because the empirical relationship between 
competition and innovation tends to rely largely on time-period or industry heterogeneity of the 
sample.  
In terms of search variety, the effects of depth and scope are significant and inverse-U in 
almost all specifications. This result partially supports Katila and Ahuja (2002), who show depth has 
an inverse-U effect whereas scope has a positive effect. In terms of time-period heterogeneity, the 
shape of the effect is almost same. On the other hand, in terms of industry heterogeneity, the peaks of 
inverse-U effect (the extremum points) are slightly different between the manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries. In the entire period, the extremum point of depth in manufacturing 
industries is smaller than in non-manufacturing industries. It is the opposite, however, in the case of 
scope. This suggests that in innovation activity, manufacturing industries tend to require less 
exploitative search (or local search) and more exploratory search (boundary-spanning or non-local 
search) than do non-manufacturing industries. This may not be intuitive, but it implies that 
non-manufacturing industries prefer R&D that generates profits more effectively (i.e., more 
exploitative search) and certainly (i.e., less exploratory search).  
 As the overall tendency of innovation activities in Japan, time-period heterogeneity is 
small among size and search variety. This suggests that the degree of patent protection (i.e., 
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appropriability condition) does not considerably change effects of these determinants. On the other 
hand, industry heterogeneity is relatively large among size, market competition, and search variety. 
Therefore, in empirical studies, industry heterogeneity, rather than time-period heterogeneity, should 
be considered.  
A remarkable case is market competition. The effect of market competition is not stable as 
argued in the innovation literature both, in terms of time-period and industry heterogeneity. Thus, 
future research may be necessary to compare results using other competition measures such as PCM 
or those as in Boone (2008a, 2008b). However, in light of the many inconclusive results in the 
literature, the empirical strategy or focus may need further consideration. As shown in this study, 
empirical results are often not robust when using proxy variables of competition and innovation at 
firm level.  
 As remaining issues, this study finds that the effect of search variety is different from 
Katila and Ahuja (2002), but the effect is relatively robust in terms of industry and time-period 
heterogeneity argued in the evolutionary economics literature (Laursen, 2012). Therefore, in future 
research, it is also worth examining other topics in Laursen (2012) such as geographical issues, 
organizational designs and slacks, and “variety paradox” (Patel and Pavitt 1997). As shown in this 
study, industry heterogeneity will be important, making the further identification of industry 
heterogeneity a worthwhile endeavor.  
25 
 
Acknowledgements  
 We appreciate support from Grant-in-Aid for Specially Promoted Research from Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science (Grant Number 26000001) and the Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry. 
26 
 
References 
Acs, Z.J., and D.B. Audretsch, 1987, “Innovation, Market Structure, and Firm Size,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol.69 (4), pp.567−574.doi: 10.2307/1935950  
Acs, Z.J., and D.B. Audretsch, 1988a, “Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical 
Analysis,” American Economic Review, Vol.78 (4), pp. 678−690. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1811167> 
Acs, Z.J., and D.B. Audretsch, 1988b, “Testing the Schumpeterian Hypothesis,” Eastern Economic 
Journal, Vol.14 (2), pp.129−140. < http://www.jstor.org/stable/40325184> 
Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griffith, and P. Howitt, 2005, “Competition and innovation: 
An inverted-U relationship,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.120 (2), 
pp.701−728. doi: 10.1162/0033553053970214 
Blundell, R., R. Griffith, and J.V. Reenen, 1999, “Market Share, Market Value and Innovation in a 
Panel of British Manufacturing Firms,” The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66 (3), pp. 
529−554. doi: 10.1111/1467-937X.00097 
Boone, J., 2008a, “Competition: Theoretical parameterizations and empirical measures,” Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 164 (4), pp.587−611. doi: 
10.1628/093245608786534640  
Boone, J., 2008b, “A New Way To Measure Competition,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 118 (531), pp. 
1245–1261. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02168.x  
Cohen, W.M. and Levin, R.C., 1989. “Chapter 18 − Empirical studies of innovation and market 
structure”, In Schmalensee, R. and R. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, 
Vol. II, pp. 1059−1107, North-Holland, Amsterdam. doi:10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02006-6 
Cohen, W.M, and S. Klepper, 1996, “A reprise of size and R&D,” Economic Journal, Vol.106 (437), 
pp.925−951. doi:10.2307/2235365 
Cohen, W. M., 2010, “Chapter 4 − fifty years of empirical studies of innovative activity and 
performance,” in Hall, B. H. and N. Rosenberg, (Eds.), Handbook of The Economics of. 
Innovation, Vol. 1, North-Holland, pp. 129−213. doi: 10.1016/S0169-7218(10)01004-X 
Correa, J.A., 2012, “Innovation and competition: an unstable relationship,” Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, Vol.27 (1), pp.160−166. doi: 10.1002/jae.1262  
Gilbert, R., 2006, “Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where are we in the competition–innovation 
debate?”, In Jaffe, A., J. Lerner, and S. Stern (Eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, 
Vol. 6, pp. 159–215, MIT Press/National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
<http://papers.nber.org/books/jaff06-1> 
Goto, A., and K. Motohashi, 2007, “Construction of a Japanese Patent Database and a first look at 
Japanese patenting activities,” Research Policy, Vol.36 (9), pp.1431−1442. doi: 
10.1016/j.respol.2007.06.005 
Hall, B.H., A.B. Jaffe, and M. Trajtenberg, 2001, “The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, 
Insights and Methodological Tools,” NBER Working Paper No. 8498. 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf> 
Horowitz, I., 1962, “Firm size and research activity”, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 28 (3), pp. 
298−301. doi: 10.2307/1055448  
Ijichi, H, T. Iwasa, H. Odagiri, H. Keira, T. Koga, A. Goto, Y. Tawara, A. Nagata, and Y. Hirano, 
2004, “Report on Japanese National Innovation Survey 2003,” Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, National Institute of Science and Technology 
Policy [Japanese]. <http://hdl.handle.net/11035/871> 
Ijichi, H, T. Iwasa, H. Odagiri, H. Keira, T. Koga, A. Goto, Y. Tawara, A. Nagata, and Y. Hirano, 
2010, “Report on Japanese National Innovation Survey 2009,” Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, National Institute of Science and Technology 
Policy [Japanese]. <http://hdl.handle.net/11035/657> 
Inui, T., A. Kawakami, and T. Miyagawa, 2012, “Market competition, differences in technology, and 
productivity improvement: An empirical analysis based on Japanese manufacturing firm 
data,” Japan and the World Economy, Vol. 24 (3), pp.197−206. doi: 
10.1016/j.japwor.2012.04.002 
27 
 
Kamien, M.I., and N.L. Schwartz, 1975, “Market structure and innovation: a survey,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol.13 (1), pp.1−37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2722211> 
Katila, R. and G. Ahuja, 2002, “Something Old, Something New: A Longitudinal Study of Search 
Behavior and New Product Introduction,” Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 45 (6), 
pp. 1183−1194. doi: 10.2307/3069433  
Laursen, K., 2012, “Keep searching and you’ll find: what do we know about variety creation through 
firms’ search activities for innovation?” Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 21 (5), 
pp.1−40. doi:10.1093/icc/dts025 
Lind, J.T., and H. Mehlum, 2010, “With or Without U? The Appropriate Test for a U-Shaped 
Relationship,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol.72 (1), pp.109−118. doi: 
10.1111/j.1468-0084.2009.00569.x 
Motohashi, K., 2004, “Chapter 2. Japan's patent system and business innovation: reassessing 
pro-patent policies,” In OECD (Eds.), Patents, Innovation and Economic Performance, 
OECD Conference Proceedings, pp. 53−82. doi:10.1787/9789264015272-en 
Motohashi, K., 2011, “Innovation and Entrepreneurship: A first look at linkage data of Japanese 
patent and enterprise census”, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 11-E-007. 
<http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/publications/summary/11020005.html>  
Motohashi, K., 2012, “Open Innovation and Firm's Survival: An empirical investigation by using a 
linked dataset of patent and enterprise census”, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 12-E-036. 
<http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/publications/summary/12050018.html> 
Nickell, S., 1996, “Competition and Corporate Performance,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104 
(4), pp. 724–746. doi:10.1086/262040 
Patel, P. and K. Pavitt, 1997, “The technological competencies of the world’s largest firms: Complex 
and path-dependent, but not much variety,” Research Policy, Vol. 26 (2), pp. 141−156. 
doi:10.1016/S0048-7333(97)00005-X 
Sakakibara, M. and L. Branstetter, 2001, “Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation? Evidence 
from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms,” The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32 
(1), pp. 77−100. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696399> 
Scherer, F.M., 1967, “Market structure and the employment of scientists and engineers”, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 57 (3), pp.524−531. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1812118> 
Schumpeter, J., 1942, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York: Harper and Row. 
Tingvall, P.G., and A. Poldahl, 2006, “Is there really an inverted U-shaped relation between 
competition and R&D?” Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Vol.15(2), 
pp.101−118. doi: 10.1080/10438590500129755 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Table 1 descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
reg 94,108 25.984 155.330 0 5397 
ln(reg+1) 94,108 1.155 1.621 0 8.594 
HHI 94,108 0.065 0.061 0.017 1.000 
depth 94,108 0.032 0.078 0 0.909 
scope 94,108 0.399 0.454 0 1.000 
kprod 94,108 −0.454 0.777 −9.179 4.510 
lprod 94,108 2.025 0.945 −4.985 9.057 
profitrate 94,108 0.242 2.489 −491.493 1.000 
lnassets 94,108 10.204 1.628 0.693 16.476 
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Table 2 Regression result 
# 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Period All All All I (64-75) I (64-75) I (64-75) 
Industry All Man. Non. All Man. Non. 
lnassets 0.223*** 0.434*** 0.065*** 0.144*** 0.242*** 0.048*** 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.009) (0.020) (0.034) (0.017) 
HHI 1.904*** 1.880* 0.228 1.802*** 2.408* 0.701 
 (0.376) (1.039) (0.246) (0.536) (1.317) (0.448) 
HHI2 −2.270*** −3.193* −0.478 −1.493*** −3.987 −0.616 
 (0.508) (1.674) (0.358) (0.555) (3.207) (0.378) 
depth 3.269*** 3.469*** 2.861*** 1.334** 1.032* 11.867* 
 (0.224) (0.246) (0.507) (0.548) (0.539) (6.911) 
depth2 −7.701*** −8.628*** −5.862*** −3.279*** −2.640*** −17.707** 
 (0.518) (0.632) (0.892) (0.940) (0.917) (7.488) 
scope 4.524*** 4.091*** 5.049*** 2.532*** 2.426*** −2.931 
 (0.165) (0.164) (0.427) (0.411) (0.412) (6.564) 
scope2 −3.717*** −3.249*** −4.403*** −1.913*** −1.847*** 3.683 
 (0.163) (0.160) (0.423) (0.408) (0.410) (6.555) 
kprod 0.068*** 0.125*** 0.033*** 0.044** 0.082** 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.022) (0.035) (0.018) 
lprod −0.074*** −0.095*** −0.048*** −0.058** −0.102** −0.024 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.025) (0.040) (0.023) 
profitrate −0.000 −0.002 −0.0004 −0.001*** −0.001** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
constant −1.549*** −2.903*** −0.615*** −0.788*** −1.383*** −0.423*** 
 (0.117) (0.194) (0.090) (0.176) (0.292) (0.157) 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
obs 94,108 54,761 39,347 17,909 12,307 5,602 
net # of firms 3,449 1,693 1,756 1,781 1,200 581 
within R squared 0.468 0.508 0.449 0.271 0.275 0.311 
between R squared 0.706 0.777 0.747 0.580 0.677 0.494 
overall R squared 0.635 0.698 0.626 0.469 0.573 0.395 
joint test (Wald test)       
HHI, HHI2 12.81*** 1.83 0.9 7.07*** 2.15 1.33 
depth, depth2 115.1*** 101.94*** 21.76*** 7.08*** 5.00*** 6.41*** 
scope, scope2 1942.44*** 1194.77*** 630.63*** 355.54*** 272.46*** 74.36*** 
slope test of HHI       
slope at min 1.829*** 1.775* 0.212 1.753*** 2.276* 0.680 
slope at max −2.634*** −4.503* −0.728 −1.183* −5.562 −0.532 
result invU invU ― invU Pos ― 
slope test of depth       
slope at min 3.269*** 3.469*** 2.861*** 1.334** 1.032* 11.867* 
slope at max −10.732*** −12.218*** −7.798*** −4.628*** −3.768*** −20.327*** 
result invU invU invU invU invU invU 
slope test of scope       
slope at min 4.524*** 4.091*** 5.049*** 2.532*** 2.426*** −2.931 
slope at max −2.909*** −2.406*** −3.757*** −1.295*** −1.269*** 4.435 
result invU invU invU invU invU ― 
Notes: (1) The upper part of table shows the result of a fixed-effects regression model. In each column, 
All, Man, and Non denote the entire, manufacturing, and non-manufacturing industries, respectively. The 
dependent variable is ln(reg+1). ***, **, * denote statistical significances at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
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respectively. Coefficients are without parentheses, whereas cluster robust standard errors (clustered by 
firm) are in parentheses. (2) The middle part of table shows the result of joint test (Wald test) for linear 
and quadratic terms of HHI, depth, and scope, respectively. Each value denotes F-value, and *** and * 
denotes statistical significances at the 1% and 10% level. (3) The lower part of table shows the result of 
slope test at the start and end of each interval: HHI, depth, and scope. Each value denotes slope at 
minimum and maximum of the interval. ***, **, * denote statistical significances at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level of two-sided t-test, respectively. “Pos”, “Neg”, and “invU” denote positive, negative, and 
inverse-U relationship of each curve, respectively.  
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Table 2 Regression result (cont.) 
# 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Period II (76-87) II (76-87) II (76-87) III (88-06) III (88-06) III (88-06) 
Industry All Man. Non. All Man. Non. 
lnassets 0.114*** 0.232*** 0.002 0.137*** 0.296*** 0.053*** 
 (0.020) (0.033) (0.013) (0.010) (0.025) (0.008) 
HHI 1.257*** 0.335 0.092 −1.062* 2.411* −2.268*** 
 (0.420) (1.210) (0.279) (0.563) (1.246) (0.650) 
HHI2 −1.506*** −2.429 −0.124 0.198 −3.740* 1.642*** 
 (0.490) (2.104) (0.359) (0.725) (2.237) (0.600) 
depth 2.073*** 1.954*** 2.842*** 2.968*** 3.261*** 1.442*** 
 (0.254) (0.263) (0.731) (0.188) (0.226) (0.341) 
depth2 −4.994*** −5.143*** −4.738*** −5.237*** −6.497*** −2.420*** 
 (0.553) (0.576) (1.316) (0.420) (0.585) (0.566) 
scope 3.137*** 3.115*** 2.555*** 2.212*** 2.426*** 2.839*** 
 (0.186) (0.196) (0.556) (0.136) (0.150) (0.308) 
scope2 −2.534*** −2.493*** −2.047*** −1.614*** −1.733*** −2.355*** 
 (0.182) (0.191) (0.553) (0.132) (0.142) (0.307) 
kprod −0.015 −0.011 0.007 0.074*** 0.147*** 0.023*** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.014) (0.011) (0.020) (0.008) 
lprod 0.001 −0.011 −0.003 −0.071*** −0.121*** −0.021* 
 (0.021) (0.036) (0.017) (0.013) (0.024) (0.012) 
profitrate 0.002 0.010 −0.001 −0.000 −0.002 −0.000 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
constant −0.301 −0.979*** 0.137 −0.344*** −2.410*** −0.126* 
 (0.199) (0.320) (0.136) (0.097) (0.268) (0.071) 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
obs 24,897 15,486 9,411 51,302 26,968 24,334 
net # of firms 2,371 1,416 955 3,311 1,589 1,722 
within R squared 0.294 0.311 0.291 0.268 0.327 0.254 
between R squared 0.800 0.818 0.818 0.741 0.765 0.641 
overall R squared 0.676 0.715 0.626 0.655 0.684 0.552 
joint test (Wald test)       
HHI, HHI2 4.77*** 1.42 0.06 2.76* 1.88 6.38*** 
depth, depth2 41.00*** 40.15*** 7.62*** 130.65*** 112.16*** 9.58*** 
scope, scope2 681.61*** 477.26*** 182.04*** 1152.73*** 604.59*** 583.05*** 
slope test of HHI       
slope at min 1.207*** 0.255 0.088 −1.055* 2.287* −2.213*** 
slope at max −1.754*** −4.521 −0.156 −0.665 −5.066 1.014 
result invU ― ― Neg Pos Neg 
slope test of depth       
slope at min 2.073*** 1.954*** 2.842*** 2.968*** 3.261*** 1.442*** 
slope at max −7.007*** −7.396*** −5.772*** −6.553*** −8.553*** −2.958*** 
result invU invU invU invU invU invU 
slope test of scope       
slope at min 3.137*** 3.115*** 2.555*** 2.212*** 2.426*** 2.839*** 
slope at max −1.931*** −1.871*** −1.540*** −1.016*** −1.041*** −1.871*** 
result invU invU invU invU invU invU 
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Figure 1. Scatter plots at firm (left) and industry (right) level in 1964-2006 
Notes: The vertical axes denote registered patents at firm (left) and industry-average (right) level 
where industry-average is based on 33 industries of small industry classification. From the top down, 
the horizontal axes denote total assets (million yen), HHI, depth, and scope, respectively. 
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Figure 2. Partial effect of HHI 
Notes: The horizontal and vertical axes denote HHI and its partial effect, respectively, in Table 2. The line 
denotes estimated effect, and the dashed lines denote the upper and lower bounds of 95% confidential 
interval, respectively. Each figure numbers correspond to the column numbers of Table 2. 
34 
 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-2
-1
0
1
2
P
ar
ti
al
 e
ff
ec
t
(1) all industries 
in all periods
(2) manufacturing industries 
in all periods
(3) non-manufacturing industries 
in all periods
P
ar
ti
al
 e
ff
ec
t
(4) all industries 
in period I
(5) manufacturing industries 
in period I
(6) non-manufacturing industries 
in period I
P
ar
ti
al
 e
ff
ec
t
(7) all industries 
in period II
(8) manufacturing industries 
in period II
(9) non-manufacturing industries 
in period II
P
ar
ti
al
 e
ff
ec
t
(10) all industries 
in period III
(11) manufacturing industries 
in period III
(12) non-manufacturing industries 
in period III
 
Figure 3. Partial effect of depth 
Notes: The horizontal and vertical axes denote depth and its partial effect, respectively, in Table 2. The 
line denotes estimated effect, and the dashed lines denote upper and lower bounds of 95% confidential 
interval, respectively. Each figure numbers correspond to the column numbers of Table 2. 
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Figure 4. Partial effect of scope 
Notes: The horizontal and vertical axes denote scope and its partial effect, respectively, in Table 2. The 
line denotes estimated effect, and the dashed lines denote upper and lower bounds of 95% confidential 
interval, respectively. Each figure numbers correspond to the column numbers of Table 2. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table A1. Industry classification and observations  
  for regression for HHI estimation 
# Industry obs (net # of firms) obs (net # of firms) 
 Large industry classification     
 Manufacturing industry 54,761 1,693 55,027 1,697 
 Non-manufacturing industry 39,347 1,756 40,054 1,783 
 Manufacturing industries     
1 food 4,750 153 4,781 153 
2 textile 3,031 88 3,051 88 
3 pulp and paper 1,416 42 1,425 43 
4 chemical 6,944 204 6,952 205 
5 pharmaceutical products 1,840 56 1,853 57 
6 petroleum  533 16 535 16 
7 rubber 880 25 881 25 
8 ceramic 2,595 78 2,600 78 
9 iron and steel 2,509 72 2,516 72 
10 non-ferrous metal 4,585 144 4,603 145 
11 machinery 8,386 252 8,414 252 
12 electric machinery 8,785 284 8,872 284 
13 shipbuilding 280 11 285 11 
14 automobile 2,836 81 2,836 81 
15 other transport equipments 805 27 809 27 
16 precision machinery 1,707 54 1,720 54 
17 other manufacturing industries 2,879 106 2,894 106 
 Non-manufacturing industries     
18 fishery 276 9 280 9 
19 mining 474 15 477 15 
20 building 7,124 222 7,154 222 
21 trading interests 9,315 364 9,361 365 
22 retail 4,811 231 4,846 232 
23 other financial industry 1,293 64 1,405 85 
24 estate 1,989 99 2,068 100 
25 rail and bus service 1,294 34 1,294 34 
26 land transportation 893 31 895 31 
27 marine transportation 1,003 27 1,016 27 
28 air transportation 221 7 224 7 
29 warehousing and allied transportation 1,450 42 1,450 42 
30 communication 570 32 592 32 
31 electric utility 441 11 441 11 
32 gas utility 463 13 463 13 
33 other service 7,730 555 8,088 558 
 Total 94,108 3,449 95,081 3,480 
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Figure A1. Scatter plot of HHI toward ln(reg+1) 
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Figure A2. Scatter plot of depth toward ln(reg+1) 
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Figure A3. Scatter plot of scope toward ln(reg+1) 
